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Providing the General Welfare? Compelling Indian Tribes
to Participate in State Unemployment Programs
Frank James Singer III
Code Sections Affected
Unemployment Insurance Code §§ 125.4, 135, 605, 634.5, 709,
710, 802, 803, 1086, 1128.1, 1253.3, 1735.1 (amended);
§§ 710.6, 804, 1119, 1141.1 (new).
AB 1537 (Horton); 2001 STAT. Ch. 255.
We must make it clear that Indians can become independent of
Federal control without being cut off from Federal concern and
Federal support.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The 106th Congress passed the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000
(2000 Act),2 which amended the definition of employers under the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) to include Indian tribes.' The 2000 Act also
directed state legislatures to amend their unemployment insurance programs to
reflect the new federal treatment of Indian tribes. Chapter 255 makes
California's unemployment program comply with this federal directive This
Article discusses whether California can force Indian tribes to pay a state
unemployment tax and whether the federal government can essentially dictate the
terms under which California includes Indian tribes in the state unemployment
insurance program.6 Finally, this Article evaluates the policy considerations that
come into play by including Indian tribes with California's unemployment
1. President Nixon, Special Message on Indian Affairs, 1970 PUB. PAPERS 564-567 (July 8, 1970),
reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 257-258 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 2d ed. 1990).
2. Federal Unemployment Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § l(a)(7), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-627 (2000).
3. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3306(c)(7) (West Supp. 2002).
4. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 3304(a)(6)(A) (West Supp. 2002) (establishing that employers of a state can
receive a credit against the federal unemployment tax if its law complies with federal standards); Notice from
the U.S. Department of Labor to All State Employment Security Agencies 3, at 2 (January 12, 2001)
[hereinafter U.S. Dep't of Labor Notice] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (informing states of the
federal requirement to include Indian tribes under their unemployment insurance programs if federally-
recognized Indian tribes reside in the state).
5. SENATE COMMITrEE ON LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1537, at
1 (July 10, 2001).
6. Infra Part IV.A-13.
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insurance program.'
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The federal government, in the wake of the Great Depression, sought to force
the states to create and manage unemployment programs.8 Rather than administer
a national unemployment program,9 Congress enacted FUTA which imposes a
tax on employers.'0 California employers receive a credit toward their FUTA tax
payment because the state unemployment program complies with federal
guidelines." The State manages an unemployment insurance program that
requires most employers to pay substantially less tax than the federal scheme
would require.
2
The federal government amended FUTA to include Indian tribes and treat the
tribes like state governments.'3 The Department of Labor (DOL) directed the
states to conform to the new treatment of Indian tribes under FUTA. ' The DOL
will not grant federal unemployment funds to California unless the State accedes
to the newly enacted federal law.' Furthermore, employers in states that do not
comply with the directive cannot enjoy a credit on the FUTA tax that is due.
6
7. Infra Part IV.C.
8. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588 (1937) (explaining that, before the federal
unemployment tax was created, states were reluctant to assess an unemployment insurance tax because it would
put implementing states at a comparative disadvantage with sister states that would not institute such public
welfare schemes).
9. See Salem Coll. & Acad., Inc. v. Employment Div., 695 P.2d 25, 29 (Or. 1985) (indicating that
Congress did not create a national unemployment insurance program by enacting FUTA).
10. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 3301 (West Supp. 2002) (imposing a 6.2 percent federal unemployment tax on the
first seven thousand dollars of income); 26 U.S.C.A. § 3306(b) (West Supp. 2002).
11. See 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 3302(a)(1), 3304 (West Supp. 2002) (giving employers in states that comply
with federal unemployment insurance provisions a credit toward the 6.2 percent federal tax).
12. See SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMIrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1537, at 2 (July 16, 2001)
(indicating that state unemployment taxes run between 0.7 percent and 5.4 percent depending on the amount of
benefits paid to former employees under an experience-rated plan). The average state unemployment tax rate is
2.9 percent. Id.
13. See Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 166, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000)
(amending 28 U.S.C.A. § 3306(c)(7) so that Indian tribes are treated like states and their political subdivisions).
14. See U.S. Dep't of Labor Notice, supra note 4, at II (directing states to enact conforming legislation
immediately, but explaining that the DOL will not take enforcement action until October 31, 2001).
15. See Letter from Julianne Broyles, Director of Insurance and Employee Relations, California
Chamber of Commerce, to the Honorable Jerome E. Horton, Assemblymember, at l(May 7, 2001) [hereinafter
Broyles Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (estimating that DOL would have withheld $340
million in federal unemployment insurance grants if Chapter 255 had not been enacted).
16. See id. (supporting Chapter 255 because it will insure that California does not risk losing $340
million in federal unemployment insurance grants); see also U.S. Dep't of Labor Notice, supra note 4, at 4
(informing that if a state does not extend unemployment insurance coverage to Indian tribes, then employers in
that state will not receive a credit against the FUTA tax); SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1537, at 3 (June 27, 2001) (explaining that if California does not
alter its unemployment insurance program to include Indian tribes, DOL could withhold $340 million in federal
grants). Also, if California fails to comply with the new federal statutes, California employers will not receive a
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Therefore, if California does not comply, its employers will be forced to pay both
the 6.2 percent tax imposed by FUTA and any unemployment taxes accessed by
the California Employment Development Department.'7
There are currently 107 Indian tribes in California, and all but 7 of these
tribes already participated in the state unemployment insurance program before
Chapter 255 was introduced.'8 In fact, the Tribal-State Gaming Compact of 1999,
which is binding on approximately fifty California tribes, stipulates that
employees of gaming operations must be -covered by state unemployment
insurance. 9
III. CHAPTER 255
Chapter 255 modifies and revamps several provisions of California's
unemployment insurance law with regard to Indian tribes so that the State's
unemployment insurance tax scheme complies with FUTA. 20 First, Chapter 255
brings Indian tribes within the scope of the California Unemployment Insurance
Code.2 Chapter 255 then defines the types of activities that are covered by
unemployment insurance.22 Indian tribes elect various kinds of coverage offered
credit toward the FUTA tax and will pay an additional 5.4 percent on the first $7,000 of taxable earnings.
Statewide, this increased tax would cost California employers $5.6 billion dollars. Id. at 4.
17. SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1537,
at 4 (June 27, 2001); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 601-852 (West Supp. 2002) (defining the scope of
California's unemployment insurance tax but not conditioning the assessment of that tax on compliance with
FUTA).
18. California Employment Development Department, Assembly Bill 1537: Fact Sheet, I [hereinafter
EDD Fact Sheet] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
19. See SENATE RULES COMMITrEE, COMMITFEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1537, at 2-4 (July 16, 2001)
(recognizing that current law does not require Indian tribes to participate in California's unemployment
insurance program but noting that Indian tribes, privy to the Tribal-State Gaming Compact of 1999, agreed that
gaming employees will participate in the State's unemployment insurance program).
20. Id. at 1; see 2001 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 255, sec. 17, at 13633 (making the provisions of Chapter 255
retroactive to December 21, 2000); CAL. UNEMP.. INS. CODE § 1086 (amended by Chapter 255) (directing
Indian tribes to register with California's Employment Development Department (EDD) within 15 days of
passage of Chapter 255).
21. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 125.4(f) (amended by Chapter 255) (including Indian tribes in the
definition of American employers); id. § 135(a)(6), (b) (amended by Chapter 255) (labeling Indian tribes as
employing units but permitting Indian tribes to treat wholly-owned subsidiaries as separate business entities,
when deciding whether to pay for coverage by reimbursing the State for benefits paid or by paying an
unemployment insurance premium based on assessed risk that the employer will impose costs on the state
unemployment fund).
22. See id. § 605(a) (amended by Chapter 255) (describing "employment" as all services performed by
an individual for an Indian tribe, even though those services are not considered employment under FUTA, so
long as those services are excluded from the FUTA definition of "employment" because of 26 U.S.C.A. §
3306(c)(7)). But see id. § 634.5(c)(2) (amended by Chapter 255) (excluding from the definition of
"employment" service performed as a member of the tribal council of an Indian tribe); id. § 634.5(e) (amended
by Chapter 255) (excluding from the definition of "employment" any service in an unemployment work relief
or work training program assisted or financed by an Indian tribe).
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by the State and federal government for the benefit of their employees.23
Generally, Indian tribes are treated like most other employers under the
California Unemployment Insurance Code.24 However, Chapter 255 allows an
Indian tribe to participate in California's unemployment insurance program by
either paying a premium that represents previous and expected future costs the
tribe imposes on the system or reimbursing the state unemployment insurance
fund whenever unemployment insurance benefits are paid to a former
employee.26 Few employers enjoy this freedom to elect reimbursement over
27payment of an experience-rated premium.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Can California Compel Indian Tribes to Participate in the State
Unemployment Insurance Program?
Under the U. S. Constitution, only the federal government has authority to
regulate Indian tribes.2" The federal government juggles two doctrines in its
23. See id. § 709 (amended by Chapter 255) (allowing Indian tribes to participate in California's
disability compensation program); id. § 710(a) (amended by Chapter 255) (granting Indian tribes the option of
covering their employees for unemployment, extended unemployment, and federal-state extended compensation
programs); id. § 710.6 (enacted by Chapter 255) (permitting Indian tribes to elect disability compensation
coverage for employees, managers, and confidential employees). But see id. § 710.6 (enacted by Chapter 255)
(compelling each Indian tribe to reach a negotiated agreement for disability compensation coverage with an
employee bargaining unit that represents that tribe's employees).
24. See, e.g., id. § 1735.1 (amended by Chapter 255) (imposing personal liability on any person who
controls the affairs of a business for unemployment insurance taxes left unpaid by the employer unless the
employer engaged in acts intended to purposefully evade the unemployment tax); id. § 1128.1(a)-(c) (amended
by Chapter 255) (subjecting Indian tribes to penalties for concealing payments in order to evade employment
taxes). But see, e.g., id. § 1141.1 (enacted by Chapter 255) (directing the EDD to notify the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) and DOL if an Indian tribe is assessed a penalty for attempting to avoid unemployment taxes but
fails to pay the assessed penalty within ninety days).
25. See id. §§ 977, 1025-1037 (West Supp. 2002) (establishing a merit rating system that calculates
premiums based on the balance of the contributions paid by and benefits charged to a specific employer).
26. See id. § 802(a) (amended by Chapter 255) (allowing Indian tribes to reimburse the State for
unemployment benefit payments made to former employees of the Indian tribes instead of forcing the tribes to
pay a premium based on the balance of contribution paid by and benefits charged to the tribe); id. § 803(b)(1)
(amended by Chapter 255) (explaining that Indian tribes choosing the reimbursable method must pay all
unemployment benefits made to former employees); id. § 803(b)(2) (amended by Chapter 255) (permitting two
or more Indian tribes to petition for joint treatment under the reimbursable method). But see id. § 803(g)(2)
(enacted by Chapter 255) (compelling the director of the EDD to terminate an Indian tribe's election to
reimburse the state rather than pay an experience-rated premium if the Indian tribe is delinquent for sums due
ninety days after notification to the tribe); id. § 804 (enacted by Chapter 255) (directing the EDD to notify the
IRS and DOL of any delinquent balance that an Indian tribe owes). Furthermore, the EDD must notify the IRS
and DOL if an Indian tribe satisfies an outstanding balance. Id.
27. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 801-805 (West Supp. 2002) (extending the right to pay for
unemployment insurance coverage by reimbursement to public entities and non-profit organizations); id. §§
821-832 (West Supp. 2002) (extending to public schools the opportunity to reimburse the State for
unemployment benefits paid to their former employees).
28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power "to regulate Commerce with.., the
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relationship with Indian tribes: plenary power and trust obligations. 9 Plenary
power is essentially the Federal government's exclusive authority to deal with the
Indians ° and absolute power to treat the Indian tribes as it sees fit.3 The United
States' trust obligation to the Indians is not as easily defined.32 Nevertheless, the
federal government has not violated its trust responsibilities, whatever they may
be, by compelling Indian tribes to participate in state unemployment insurance
programs because such programs arguably promote the general welfare of the
tribes.33
The U. S. Constitution limits the states' abilities to regulate and tax Indian
tribes." Direct state taxes on tribes or tribal members are presumed to be
invalid.35 However, states are allowed to tax Indian tribes if Congress authorizes
the tax.36 California's unemployment tax fits this caveat because the federal
government adopted legislation directing state governments to include Indian
tribes in state unemployment insurance programs."
Indian tribes"); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985) (declaring that the
Constitution makes Indian relations the exclusive province of federal law).
29. Ray Torgerson, Comment, Sword Wielding and Shield Bearing: An Idealistic Assessment of the
Federal Trust Doctrine in American Indian Law, 2 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 165, 165 (1996).
30. See Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055, 1190, 1225 (1995)
(arguing that earlier Supreme Court cases reflected a dormant Indian Commerce Clause doctrine that
"automatically excluded state authority from Indian country over any matter directly or indirectly affecting
Indians" and attributing "the rapid downturn in tribal success rates in cases heard by the Supreme Court" to the
doctrine's collapse).
31. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (holding that "[t]he sovereignty that the
Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character [and]... exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is
subject to complete defeasance"); see also Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 718 (1943)
(mentioning that "it is settled that the grant of citizenship to the Indians is not inconsistent with their status as
ward whose property is subject to the plenary control of the federal government .... [i]t rests with Congress to
determine when the guardian relation shall cease").
32. CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 8, 10 (2d ed.
1998) (acknowledging that the scope of the United States' trust responsibility to Indians is unclear). However,
the authors conclude that the general trust relationship between the United States and Indian tribes is
insufficient for either retroactive or prospective relief. Id. at 9-10. But see Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553
(1974) (holding that common-law trust obligations justified a differential review of hiring preferences that
benefited tribal members).
33. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586-87 (1937) (holding that unemployment
insurance benefits promote the general welfare by satisfying fiscal, economic, social, and moral goals).
34. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 453 (1995) (nullifying an Oklahoma
fuel tax because the tax was not authorized by Congress and because the legal incidence of the tax rested on an
Indian tribe or on tribal members for sales made inside Indian country).
35. See id. at 458 (citing County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502
U.S. 251, 258 (1992), which applied a categorical approach when states attempt to tax Indian lands or Indian
tribe members on Indian tribe land). A state may not tax Indian land or Indian tribe members living on Indian
land unless jurisdiction is ceded or a federal statute permits the tax. Id.
36. Id.; see, e.g., Bridges v. Stick, 106 F. Supp. 506, 509-10 (E.D. Okla. 1954) (holding that a tax sale of
Indian land was valid because a federal statute required Indians to file a tax exemption certificate with the
county recorder). The Indian landowner failed to file a tax exemption certificate, and therefore her land became
subject to state taxation. Id.
37. Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 166, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000)
(codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. §§ 3306, 3309).
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B. Can the Department of Labor Withhold Federal Funding From and Deny
Tax Credits to California if the State Legislature Does Not Alter Its
Unemployment Statute to Comply with Federal Law?
The Supremacy Clause38  of the U.S. Constitution mandates that
constitutionally enacted federal law trumps a conflicting state statute.39 However,
FUTA does not compel the states to adopt or maintain unemployment
compensation programs.4° Rather, FUTA represents "cooperative federalism"
whereby the federal government creates an incentive for the states to implement a
desired social program while mitigating fears of comparative disadvantage with
sister states.4 1 The Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution4 2 allows Congress to
condition the grant of federal funds to the States.4 ' However, the spending power
is limited in four ways." First, the spending power must be used in the pursuit of
the general welfare.5 Second, Congress may only condition the receipt of federal
funds unambiguously so states can decide to submit to the federal act aware of
the consequences. 6 Third, the conditions must relate to the federal interest in the
particular national program. 7 Fourth, constitutional provisions other than the
spending clause may prohibit the conditional grant of federal funds.48
The U.S. Supreme Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the
federal unemployment insurance tax scheme.49 Notwithstanding, the 2000 Act
may raise a novel constitutional challenge because it arguably forces Califomia
38. See U.S. CONST, art VI, § 2 (establishing that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land, and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.").
39. See McCulloch v Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819) (holding that "the government of the Union,
though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action.").
40. Salem Coll. & Acad., Inc. v. Employment Div., 695 P.2d 25, 29 (Or. 1985).
41. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589 (1937) (reciting arguments in support of FUTA
because "its operation is not constraint, but the creation of a larger freedom, the states and the nation joining in
a cooperative endeavor to avert a common evil"); Salem Coll., 695 P.2d at 30 (citing Carmichael v. S. Coal &
Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 525-26 (1937), categorizing state unemployment compensation programs as
"cooperative federalism," and concluding that the Supremacy Clause did not apply to conflicts between FUTA
and state law as a result).
42. U.S. CONST, art I, § 8, cl. 1.
43. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205, 207 (1987) (considering the constitutionality of a
grant of federal transportation funds conditioned upon the State raising the legal drinking age to twenty-one).
44. Id. at 207-08.
45. Id. at 207 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937)); see also Helvering, 301 U.S. at
640, 645 (holding that courts should substantially defer to Congress' determination of what promotes the
general welfare).
46. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
47. Id. (citing Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion)). Cf Dole,
483 U.S. at 217-18 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (arguing that a condition on spending must be reasonably related
to the expenditure of federal funds).
48. Id. at 207 (citing Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985)).
49. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 573-74, 591 (1937).
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to make a difficult choice: subsidize unemployment in the Indian tribes or lose
significant federal grants and tax credits." California may argue that the federal
legislation unconstitutionally forces one sovereign state to subsidize another
sovereign which is independent from the state.' However, the U.S. Supreme
Court has limited the ability of the states to insulate themselves from federal
regulation by relying on their sovereignty. 2 In essence, all congressional acts are
presumed to be consistent with state sovereignty because the U.S. Constitution
implements a bicameral legislative system that adequately represents the interests
of the individual states. 3 Therefore, the federal government can essentially
compel California to change its unemployment statute by economic persuasion.
California's sovereign interests were adequately represented in the drafting and
enactment of the 2000 Act, and therefore the 2000 Act appears to be a
constitutional exercise of federal power.4
C. Should Indian Tribes Participate in California's Unemployment
Compensation Program?
Unemployment is the difference between the number of workers who quit or
lose their jobs and those workers who are working or hired.5 Unemployment is
unavoidable because workers constantly quit or lose jobs. 6  Sound
macroeconomic theory shows that policy aimed at lowering unemployment must
either reduce the rate of job separation or increase the rate of job finding.57
50. See infra Part IV.C (explaining how Chapter 255 results in California employers subsidizing
unemployment in Indian tribes).
51. Cf Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537 (1985) (paraphrasing the state's
argument that a federal statute that conditions the grant of transportation funds on compliance with federal
minimum wage and overtime provisions is unconstitutional when applied to a sovereign state).
52. See id. at 554 (citing EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983) which stated that there is no
"sacred province of state autonomy" and that a state must show a procedural flaw that prevents the state from
having its sovereign interests represented in the federal political process).
53. Id. at 551-57.
54. Id.; see Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 591 (holding that FUTA does not unconstitutionally impinge
upon state rights of self-legislation because the act simply provides a way for the states to avoid a federal tax by
satisfying the federal concern at a local level). The Court also held that FUTA's persuasive ramifications did not
exceed federal power. Id.
55. N. GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS 119 (2d ed. 1994).
56. See SAUL BLAUSTEIN, ET AL., UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: ANALYSIS OF
POLICY ISSUES 2 (Christoper J. O'Leary & Stephen A. Wandner eds. 1993) (stating "[tihere is a recognition that
workers in an industrial economy are separated from the subsistence guaranteed by the land in an agrarian
society.").
57. MANKIW, supra note 55, at 119-21, (citing Robert E. Hall, A Theory of the Natural Rate of
Unemployment and the Duration of Unemployment, JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS 5, 153-69 (April
1979)). Mr. Hall defines the total labor force (L) as the number of employed workers (E) plus the number of
unemployed workers (U) (i.e., L=E+U). The unemployment rate is the ratio of unemployed workers to the total
work force (i.e., 4 ). When unemployment rate is steady, the number of people losing jobs is equal to the
number of people finding jobs. This is demonstrated by equating the product of employed workers with the job
separation rate (s) and the product of unemployed workers with the job finding rate (f) (i.e., JU=sE). If L=E+U,
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Unemployment insurance programs are problematic because they raise the
rate of job separation and lower the rate of job finding.58 Furthermore,
unemployment insurance programs lead to inefficient allocations of labor
because the programs foster cross-subsidization of employers. 9 Moreover,
workers will save less money if they expect government-provided benefits during
unemployment.60
That said, there are social policy justifications for providing temporary
unemployment insurance benefits to jobseekers. First, unemployment benefits
assure workers that a certain level of income will always be available.61 In
addition, creating an incentive for workers to reject job offers for undesirable
62positions may lead to subsequent offers of better-suited employment.
then E=L-U which can be substituted into the steady state of unemployment formula such that jU=s(L-U). This
hybrid formula shows that the unemployment rate is equal to the job separation rate (s) divided by the sum of
the job separation rate and the job finding rate (f) (i.e., = - ). Hence, increases in the job separation rate
increase unemployment while increases in the job finding rate decrease unemployment. Id.
58. See MANKIW, supra note 55, at 123 (explaining that unemployment insurance raises the rate of job
separation because workers are guaranteed a degree of financial security should employment end). Therefore
workers will not demand job security provisions as vigorously as they would if unemployment insurance would
not exist. Also, unemployment insurance lowers the job-finding rate because unemployed workers are more
likely to turn down job offers because the economic hardship of unemployment is mitigated. Id. See also
WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 291 (6th ed. 1995)
(defining "moral hazard" as the reduced incentive for an individual to avoid costs that minimize the probability
of loss when provided with insurance coverage).
59. George C. Leef, Unemployment Insurance: The Case for a Market Alternative, REGULATION 19, at
23-24 (Winter 1998). Mr. Leef explains that all state unemployment taxes use an experience rating, but there are
still employers that rarely impose costs on the unemployment insurance fund because they rarely discharge
employees. However, there are employers who, by the nature of their business, frequently discharge employees
and impose substantial costs on the state unemployment insurance coffers, but do not completely reimburse
these costs because they are only mandated to pay a fixed rate. This dichotomy results in a subsidy to employers
with unstable labor demands and diminished salaries for employees to whom the state guarantees some payment
after employment. Thus the price of goods and services produced by these negative-balance employers do not
reflect the true social costs incurred. This results in artificial over-production in the negative-balance sector and
inefficient under-production in the positive-balance sector. Furthermore, most firms are competitive and lack
real market power. Thus, these firms pass taxes on to their employees in the form of diminished wages. Hence,
employees in stable work subsidize industry with either seasonal or otherwise unstable labor demands. Id.
60. Id. at 25. Mr. Leef argues that unemployment insurance benefits reduce the incentive to save
privately because people prefer immediate spending to deferred spending and save money for periodic
unemployment if they have no other source of income during unemployment. This lack of precautionary
spending adversely affects workers because, by saving less, they avoid wealth accumulation. Furthermore, a
lack of private spending, coupled with unemployment tax payments that fund unemployment insurance
programs, restricts the pool of capital and diverts resources from market-determined uses to uses made by
government. The government transfers surplus revenue from unemployment taxes into government trust funds
invested in federal debt securities, thereby moving significant amounts of capital away from the private sector.
Id.
61. MANKIW, supra note 55, at 123.
62. See id. at 121-23 (arguing that workers are not uniform in their preferences and abilities and
therefore may want to reject certain job offers because the jobs require certain skills that a worker does not want
to develop (e.g., answering telephones or selling goods and services) or demand contribution that the employee
is not willing to render (e.g., excessive travel), or provide an undesirable wage). Also, information regarding
employment is imperfect and the transition between jobs is not fluid. Job-seekers may reject a job offer under
the assumption that they are unfamiliar with superior job opportunities they believe exist in the marketplace but
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Unemployment insurance programs arguably provide economic stabilization.63
Furthermore, these programs maintain a steady work force in certain industries.'
Finally, unemployment benefits may render a benefit to the public by reducing
61
crime.
Since Indian tribes choose either to pay an experience-rated tax or to
reimburse the state for unemployment benefits paid,66 invariably tribes with
stable labor demand, will choose the reimbursable method while tribes with
volatile employee pools will select the experience-rated method.67 Thus, the tribes
will segregate themselves into risk pools and those tribes that would pay more in
premiums than their employees would siphon off in benefits will not be forced to
subsidize their sister tribes. 6s However, those tribes that remain in the experience-
rated system will impose a burden on the state unemployment insurance fund and
drain resources acquired from typical California employers that may not select
the reimbursable method. 69
Furthermore, Indian tribes that operate multiple employing subsidiaries will
assess the expected liability each employing unit imposes on the State's
unemployment fund and subscribe to the reimbursable method, if there is little
chance of incurring costs to the unemployment fund, or subscribe to the
are not well published. Id.
63. See Leef, supra note 59, at 22 (outlining and ultimately rejecting the argument that unemployment
programs provide economic stability because "when the economy has fallen into a recession, it needs increased
consumer spending, which is immediately provided by a surge in [unemployment insurance] benefits to the
unemployed. On the other hand, when the economy is strong, [unemployment insurance] taxes exceed benefit
payments, thus helping to restrain the development of an inflationary boom").
64. See id. at 23 (agreeing that unemployment benefits prevent a group of unemployed workers with
skills and experience critical to a certain industry from leaving that industry and seeking employment elsewhere
because the industry in which the unemployed are skilled does not require more labor). However, Mr. Leef
concludes that this argument, while valid, is not sufficient to warrant a govemment-managed unemployment
insurance program. Id.
65. See Richard B. Freeman, Crime and Unemployment, CRIME AND PUB. POL'Y (1983), cited in
ARTHUR O'SULLIVAN, URBAN ECONOMICS 665 (3d ed. 1996) (concluding that there is a weak relationship
between unemployment and crime). But see Thomas Orsagh & Ann D. Witte, Economic Status and Crime:
Implications for Offender Rehabilitation, 3 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 72 (1981), cited in ARTHUR
O'SULLIVAN, URBAN ECONOMICS 668 (3d ed. 1996) (finding little evidence of a significant relationship
between unemployment and crime).
66. Supra Part III.
67. See NICHOLSON, supra note 58, at 301 (illustrating this point with a hypothetical insurance problem
where one insurer faces two groups: one group imposing a high risk of loss and another group imposing a low
risk of loss). The insurer is unable to discern high risk and low risk applicants. Thus the insurer cannot simply
offer a premium based on the low-risk probability of loss because applicants with high risks of loss will opt to
pay the lower premium. However, if the insurer tries to pool the risk of the two groups and offer a premium
based on the average risk of loss, applicants imposing a low risk of loss may avoid insurance altogether. Id.
68. Id.; see also Leef, supra note 59, at 22 (acknowledging that if paying unemployment insurance
premiums is voluntary, low-risk members will form their own risk pool and cause high-risk members to pay
escalated premiums).
69. See Leef, supra note 59, at 23 (criticizing the current unemployment insurance program because the
system compels employers with stable employment conditions to subsidize those employers who impose more
costs on the unemployment fund than they contribute in premiums).
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experience-rated payment plan if there is a high probability that the employing
unit will impose costs on the unemployment fund.7 ° This will cause Indian tribes
to create employing subsidiaries with homogeneous risk expectations.7'
However, typical private employers cannot choose to assign themselves to
risk pools by electing either the reimbursable method of payment or the
experience-rated plan.72 Moreover, employers who choose between the
reimbursable payment plan and the experience-rated plan cannot treat
subsidiaries differently. 3 Neither of these constraints applies to Indian tribes.7
Therefore, Chapter 255 will ultimately result in stable private California
employers subsidizing Indian-controlled companies in industries that create
• • 75
relatively high amounts of unemployment in California.
V. CONCLUSION
Obviously California should avoid imposing a $5.6 billion cost on its
employers and absorbing a $340 million loss in federal unemployment insurance
grants.76 If nothing else, Chapter 255 is commendable because it avoids these
forfeitures.77 And to be sure, benefits are conferred on society when
unemployment insurance is available. The problem is that the means used to
obtain those benefits-a government tax-create more unemployment and result
70. See NICHOLSON, supra note 58, at 296 (explaining that a moral hazard exists when the level of
expected payment that one actor is to receive from another depends in part on actions by the recipient that are
difficult to monitor). Furthermore, Professor Nicholson explains that the problem of moral hazard is based upon
an asymmetry of information; generally the buyers of insurance can estimate their probability of loss more
accurately than insurers. Id.
71. See id. at 291 (insisting that moral hazard is not a question of right or wrong but rather recognition
that individuals will respond to the incentives they face).
72. See 60 CAL. JUR. 3D Unemployment Compensation § 12 (1994) (recognizing that a limited number
of employers are allowed to provide unemployment' benefits through reimbursement rather than experience-
rated premiums); see supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing how Chapter 255 allows Indian tribes to
participate in California's unemployment insurance program).
73. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 135(b) (amended by Chapter 255) (treating all individuals
performing services for an employer with two or more establishments as if they were employed by one
employer unless the employer is an Indian tribe).
74. Id. §§ 135(b), 802(a) (amended by Chapter 255).
75. See EDD Fact Sheet, supra note 18, at I (contending that the gaming industry generally suffers high
employee turnover). But see E-mail from Jim Shabi, Nevada Department of Employment, Training, and
Rehabilitation, to Frank J. Singer III, McGeorge School of Law (Aug. 24, 2001, 14:33 PST) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (indicating that there are no formal statistics that determine whether the gaming
industry results in relatively high unemployment). Mr. Mike Clarke of the same office opines that there is no
theoretical reason why gaming would result in higher unemployment than the retail or construction industries.
Id.
76. EDD Fact Sheet, supra note 18, at 2.
77. See 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 3302(a)(1), 3304 (West Supp. 2001) (allowing employers in states that comply
with federal law to use a credit against the FUTA tax).
78. Supra Part IV.C.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 33
in an inefficient allocation of labor resources.79 Chapter 255 is a legal exercise of
government power, and the statute does not consider alternative methods of
providing unemployment insurance coverage.8" However, Chapter 255 does
impose a government tax to fund a government insurance program on a new
group of people.82 Thus, it implicitly raises the question of whether there are
alternative means of providing unemployment insurance coverage that yield the
benefits of the current system but avoid some of the detriments."
79. Supra Part IV.C.3.
80. Supra Part IV.A-B.
81. Id.
82. Supra Part 11.3.
83. See Leef, supra note 59, at 26 (proposing the elimination of the current unemployment insurance
scheme and the creation of individual unemployment accounts). Mr. Leef contends that this new system would
be more flexible to the needs of the unemployed, and it would encourage individual responsibility, reduce costs
through competition, and mitigate cross-subsidization. Id.
